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NOTES
RES JUDICATA-THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
By EDWARD S. BARLOCK
Edward S. Barlock received his B.S. in
Law from the University of Denver College
of Law in 1957. He is a senior in the Col-
lege of Law, Editor-in-Chief of DICTA,
secretary of both the student Board of
Governors and student Senate, a member
of Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity and a
member of Omicron Delta Kappa, na-
tional men's honorary.
Most lawyers are familiar with the doctrine of res judicata.' How-
ever, many of them are not very well acquainted with the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, a flexible segment of res judicata.' The two doctrines
are closely related parts of the law of judgments.' They are similar but
distinct.' Although one is considered to be a part of the other, they ap-
ply to different situations and have different effects. One narrows the
scope of inquiry, the other operates as a complete bar. One is somewhat
flexible, the other is rigid. It is helpful, therefore, to understand the
fundamental differences between them.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
At the outset, definitions of the two doctrines will help to frame
the necessary distinctions. Res judicata is the doctrine that an existing
final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion is conclusive of the rights of the parties in a subsequent suit based
on the same claim.' On the other hand, collateral estoppel is the doc-
trine that the final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction on an
issue actually litigated and determined is conclusive of that issue in a
subsequent suit between the same parties based on a different cause of
action.7
In identifying collateral estoppel the courts use varied terminology,
such as: "estoppel by record," "estoppel by findings," "estoppel by ver-
1The "merger" and "bar" aspects of res judicata are discussed in Bigelow,
Estoppel 41 (6th ed. 1913).
2 See Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev.
217 (1954).
3 Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 -arv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
4 Id. at 3.
5 Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Fraita Improvement Co., 37 Colo. 483, 501, 86 Pae.
324, 329 (1906).
6 Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Ginsberg, 131 Colo. 1, 278 P.2d 1018 (1955).
7 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876) (leading Supreme Court case on
the distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel).
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dict," and "estoppel by judgment."' Since the use of different terms to de-
scribe the same legal doctrine can be a source of confusion, it is neces-
sary to mention that these terms actually do stand for the same propo-
sition. Another point that should be kept in mind with respect to the
use of terms is that the courts often use the term res judicata to include
collateral estoppel.'
As has been observed already, there are several features of res
judicata and collateral estoppel which distinguish one from the other.
For one thing, the area of applicability is different. That is to say, col-
lateral estoppel applies to a cause of action different from that involved
in the original controversy but res judicata applies to a suit based on the
same cause of action as that involved in the original controversy. In
this respect collateral estoppel is broader than the "merger" and "bar"
aspects of res judicata." However, it does not apply to matters which
could have been litigated but were not. " In this respect it is narrower
than the "merger" and "bar" aspects of res judicata. "
With these preliminary distinctions in mind, attention is directed
toward the doctrine of collateral estoppel as applied by the courts. It is
submitted that, while the basic requirements of the doctrine are clear,
the language and analyses in the cases are far from satisfactory. The wide
scope of the subject matter does not permit a complete treatment here,
but it is hoped that the sources referred to will provide an adequate sup-
plement. No attempt will be made to discuss res judicata in its "merger"
and "bar" aspects. That is beyond the limited scope of this note. How-
ever, cases dealing with collateral estoppel will be viewed in relation to
general principles of applicability. In addition, some Colorado cases in
which the doctrine has been applied will be discussed. It is hoped that
in this setting some worthwhile conclusions can be drawn.
AREA OF APPLICABILITY
A. Matters Actually Litigated and Determined
It is well settled that in order to invoke the doctrine of collateral
estoppel it is necessary that the issues sought to be relitigated have been
actually litigated and determined in a prior action between the same
parties." Consequently, while those matters which were litigated and
determined of necessity in the prior action cannot be relitigated, the
parties are not precluded from relying upon matters which were not liti-
gated and which give rise to a different claim for relief." This is true
even though the new matter could have been determined in the original
action.
The scope of applicability with respect to matters actually litigated
and determined has been passed upon many times. A few illustrations
will show that the courts are reluctant to preclude a party from litigat-
ing an issue when he has not had his day in court as to that issue.
8 See note 2 supra.
9 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir.
1941); Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105, 110, 76 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1938).
10 See note 7 supra.
11 See note 1 supra.
12 Peckham v. Family Loan Co., 196 F.2d S38 (5th Cir. 1952).
13 See note 1 supra.
14 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Hinsdale County v. Mineral
County, 38 Colo. 433, 88 Pac. 436 (1907).




In Cromwell v. County of Sac," a leading United States Supreme
Court case, the plaintiff brought an action to recover on coupons ac-
crued on bonds. In its answer the defendant averred that the bonds
had been issued fraudulently because a county official had been bribed.
A judgment for the defendant was affirmed on the ground that the bonds
had been issued fraudulently and that the plaintiff had not proved
payment of value. After the bonds had matured the plaintiff brought
a second action to recover the principal and the interest accrued after
the first action. The defendant county pleaded the former judgment,
asserting that the question of payment of value had been determined.
The defendant received a favorable judgment on that ground but the
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court and it reversed. The Court
held that the question of payment of value actually had not been liti-
gated and that the prior judgment worked an estoppel only as to mat-
ters actually decided.
In a 1906 case1" the Colorado Supreme Court followed the Cromwell
decision. A stockholder brought an action to enjoin the execution of a
contract by a company of which he was a member. He alleged that the
company had made a contract in violation of its charter and by-laws
and that it was unlawfully attempting to assess him. A decree for the
plaintiff was entered, enjoining the company from executing the con-
tract or levying any assessment for that purpose. Thereafter, the origi-
nal assessment was reduced and the plaintiff was notified of the new
assessment. Upon his failure to pay, the plaintiff's stock was sold pursu-
ant to the by-laws. The plaintiff then brought another action for dam-
ages on the ground that such sale was illegal because the assessment was
void, in accordance with the former decree. The defendant sought to
show that the reduced assessment was proper. The court held that the
judgment in the first suit was not necessarily conclusive against the
validity of the reduced assessment and that the burden was upon the
plaintiff to show that the validity of the original assessment had been
litigated and determined in the first action."
In Jacobson v. Miller," an early Michigan case, the plaintiff sued
the defendant to recover some rentals due under a lease. There was a
judgment for the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought another
action under the same lease to recover rentals subsequently due. This
17 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
is Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Fruita Improvement Co., 37 Colo. 483, 86 Pac.
324 (1906).
19 Id. at 503, 86 Pac. 329.
20 41 Mich. 90 (1879).
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time the defendant denied that the lease had been executed. The lower
court held that the earlier judgment precluded the defendant from mak-
ing such a denial. On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
the lower court because the question of execution had not been litigated
in the first action. However, the court indicated that if the question of
execution had been raised and litigated in the first action, it would have
been a final determination of that issue even though the second suit was
based on a different cause of action.
The three cases just discussed clearly show the difference between
the effect of a judgment as a bar against the bringing of a second action
based on the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in an-
other action between the same parties and based on a different claim or
demand. If the second suit is based on the same claim, the first judg-
ment constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. It concludes the
parties as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or de-
feat the claim and as to every other substantial matter which might have
been offered for that purpose. But if the second action is based on a
claim or demand different from that involved in the first action, the
judgment operates as an estoppel only as to those matters which were
actually litigated and determined in the first.
2 1
B. Matters Immaterial or unessential to the First Judgment
In addition to the requirement that the issue must have been ac-
tually litigated and determined in the first action, there is another rule
which narrows the area of applicability even further and which presents
more subtle problems when it is applied to a given case. A statement
of this rule is that even where a matter is puLit in issue and decided, it is
not concluded by the judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel, if it
was immaterial or unessential to the determination of the real and de-
cisive issue."2
The rule was applied by the 'Wisconsin Supreme Court in Schofield
v. Rideout." In that case a daughter had brought an action against her
father, alleging that she had conveyed certain land to him, that he had
agreed to sell it and pay the proceeds to her and that he had broken the
21 Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Fruita. Improvement Co., 37 Colo. at 500, 501,
S6 Pac. at 328 (1906).
22 Landon v. Clark, 221 Fed. 841 (2d Cir. 1915): House v. Lockwood. 137 N.Y. 259,
33 N.E. 595 (1893): Word v. Coll.ey, 173 S.-\%. 629 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914): Willis v. Willis,
48 Wyo. 403. 49 P.2d 670 (1935).
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agreement. The court found that such an agreement had been made
but that the father had not violated it because he had tried to sell the
land and had been unable to find a buyer. Accordingly, a judgment
was entered dismissing the complaint. Thereafter, an assignee of the
daughter's interest brought an action against the father. The plaintiff
alleged that the father had subsequently conveyed the land to his wife.
The plaintiff offered proof of the agreement but did not prove the con-
veyance had been made. The trial court gave judgment for the plain-
tiff on the ground that the agreement was conclusively established by
the former judgment. The supreme court reversed and remanded for
trial on the question of the existence of the agreement. The court based
its decision on the ground that the finding in the first action that the
agreement existed was not necessary to the decision.
Although the view followed in the Schofield case seems to be well
established, 4 Clark v. Knox,"5 a 1904 Colorado case, may be cited for
the opposite view. In that case the grantee of an insolvent debtor brought
an action against an attaching creditor to remove a cloud from the title
to certain real estate. The pleadings raised two issues. One was that the
conveyance by the debtor was in fraud of creditors, the other that the
deed was delivered after the levy of attachment. The trial court found
both issues in favor of the attaching creditor. On appeal the appellate
court reversed the trial court on the question of fraud, holding that the
conveyance was not fraudulent, but it affirmed the judgment on the sec-
ond issue. In a subsequent action between the same parties but involv-
ing other real property conveyed by the same deed and levied on by
writ of execution after the delivery of the deed, the court held that the
prior judgment on the question of fraud was res judicata. The court
said:
"The fact that it was not essential that the court of appeals
should pass on the question of fraud, because the judgment was
predicated entirely upon the finding on the other issue in the
case . . . is not material. Such a finding, it is true, was conclu-
sive of the rights of the parties, yet this did not preclude the
court from passing upon the other issue of fraud which was pre-
sented by the pleadings and argued by counsel."2
The decision in Clark v. Knox is not too far out of line when one
realizes that the question of fraud had been argued before the Colorado
Court of Appeals and had been decided on the merits. Indeed if the
court had reached the opposite result, the defendant would have had to
defend a second time against the allegation that the conveyance was
fraudulent. It is submitted that the language of the Colorado Supreme
Court to the effect that the applicability of collateral estoppel or res
judicata must always be considered in connection with the facts of the
particular case must not be taken lightly."
C. Prior Determination of Negligence
The determination of the question of negligence is an area which
requires close examination and one which is particularly interesting in
the application of collateral estoppel. The two cases set out below
indicate the complexity of problems raised by applying the doctrine
24 See note 22 supra.
25 32 Colo. 342, 76 Pac. 372 (1904).
26 Id. at 352, 353, 76 Pac. at 375.
27 Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105, 108, 76 P.2d 1117, 1118 (1938).
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in this area. Under a different heading the really controversial ques-
tion as to whether strangers to the initial action should be allowed
to rely on collateral estoppel in certain types of negligence cases will
receive some brief comment.
In Cambria v. Jeffrey," the Massachusetts court refused to apply
the doctrine on the ground that a finding as to the issue of negligence,
which was crucial in the second case, had not been essential to the de-
cision in the first action. The case was an action for damages arising
out of an automobile collision. The trial court found that the collision
was the result of the concurrent negligence of the parties and gave judg-
ment for the defendant. The defendant in the first action turned around
and sued the former plaintiff for damages from the collision. A jury
verdict in his favor was set aside on the ground that the earlier judg-
ment, since it determined that both parties were guilty of negligence,
precluded recovery. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed and
judgment was entered on the verdict.
An interesting contrast to the Cambria decision is Lamberton
Coach Co. v. Stone, 9 a North Carolina case involving the question of
conclusiveness of a consent judgment in a negligence case. A bus pas-
senger died as the result of a collision between a tractor and the
bus. His personal representative brought an action for wrongful death
and joined the tractor company and the bus company as defendants.
Each defendant denied liability and alleged that the other was negligent.
However, a consent judgment was entered granting the plaintiff re-
covery from the co-defendants. In a later action the bus company
sued the tractor company and the latter set up the consent judgment as
a bar to recovery. The court held the defense good since the negligence
of the plaintiff had been determined judicially in the prior action.
D. Applicability of the Doctrine to Non-Parties
In order to take advantage of collateral estoppel the person assert-
ing its applicability must have been a party to the prior proceeding
or in privity with a party."0 This principle has been strictly applied
so that nominal parties and parties not having a real interest in the
controversy will not be collaterally estopped from raising issues deter-
mined in a prior suit based on a different cause of action. 1
An interesting case in which the court might well have applied
collateral estoppel had it not been for the doctrine of identity of parties
is Gilman v. Gilman." There the plaintiff's wife had been injured
while riding as a passenger in the defendant's car. The wife sued for
damages and recovered. Subsequently, the husband sued the same de-
fendant for loss of his wife's services and for medical expenses. The
defendant's liability in the action brought by the husband depended
on the same facts that had established the defendant's negligence in the
action previously brought by the wife. Despite the identity of the issues,
the court held that the defendant could again deny the negligent char-
acter of his driving.
The Gilman case represents the prevailing view. There is some
indication, however, that strict adherence to the requirement of identity
28 307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940).
29 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E.2d 673 (1952).
30 Gumieny v. Hess, 285 Mich. 411, 280 N.WV. 809 (1938).
31 Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 212 Ind. 120, 6 N.E.2d 938 (1937).
32 115 Vt. 49, 51 A.2d 46 (1947).
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of parties may be breaking down." It would appear that where the
issues are identical, e.g., in a series of actions by passengers injured
through the fault of a common carrier in the same accident-the courts
should not adhere blindly to the requirement of identity of parties.
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE SAME CLAIM
The question as to what constitutes the same claim is of great im-
portance because res judicata applies where the second action is based
on the same claim and collateral estoppel applies where the second
action is based on a different claim. The rule that parties may be pre-
cluded from relitigating an issue even though the second suit is based
on a different cause of action is well established. 4 However, it must be
kept in mind that while res judicata concludes the rights of the parties
in the second suit, collateral estoppel only precludes relitigation of
matters determined of necessity in the prior action." The importance
of this distinction has been brought out in Colorado cases.
In Albertson v. Clark, " the plaintiff brought an action to recover
for services rendered as an attorney under a contract. He received a fa-
vorable judgment and, while the suit was pending on appeal, he brought
another action to recover for additional services rendered pursuant
to the contract. Before the second suit was disposed of the first action
had been finally determined in the attorney's favor. The defendant
sought to relitigate the issue as to whether the contract pleaded in the
first action was a forgery. The court held that the defendant could not
relitigate the issue. It said that the cause of action need not be the same
if the issue determined between the parties in the earlier action is the
same."7
While the fact that the cause of action was not the same did not pre-
vent the court from holding that the issue of forgery could not be re-
litigated in Albertson v. Clark, it had a different effect in Youngquest v.
Youngquest." In the latter case the administratrix of the decedent's
estate had obtained an order restraining the American National Bank
from paying out or disposing of any funds in a certain checking account
which allegedly was the joint account of the decedent and the claimant.
The claimant filed a petition praying that the restraining order be dis-
solved. The petition was denied. The claimant then commenced an ac-
tion in which she alleged absolute individual ownership of a portion of
the account. She offered proof that she had put $1,800 of her own
money into the account. The Colorado Supreme Court, in holding that
she was not precluded from maintaining the action said: "The principle
contended for (res judicata) is controlling where the second action is
based on the same claim as was asserted in the first, but where the second
proceeding is based upon a different claim, only matters actually litigated
in the first action are concluded.' "
In support of its position the court emphasized that the cause of
action in the first suit had been based on the alleged existence of a joint
bank account in which the claimant had asserted the right of survivor-
33 Polasky, Collateral Estoppel--ffects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 243-48
(1954).
34 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
35 Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U.S. 122 (1907).
.16 70 Colo. 129, 197 Pac. 757 (1921).
37 Id. at 130, 197 Pac. 758.
38 102 Colo. 105, 76 P.2d 1117 (1938).
39 Id. at 110, 76 P.2d at 1119.
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ship, whereas the suit presently before the court was based on the
claimant's alleged absolute ownership of a part of the account."°
The Youngquest case indicates the difference between the preclu-
sive effect of res judicata and the preclusive effect of collateral estoppel.
The fact that the cause of action in the second suit was different was
the decisive factor. It was not disputed that in the initial suit the claim-
ant asserted her right to the entire account. Thus, in a very real sense,
the subject matter involved in the second suit was also involved in the
first. In addition, the parties were identical. It was the difference in the
claim that made collateral estoppel the only possible test. Since the same
issue had not been actually litigated before, the claimant was not barred
from maintaining her action.
CONCLUSION
Collateral estoppel is a desirable doctrine which aids in the expedi-
ent termination of costly litigation. However, if it is not properly ap-
plied it can result in serious injustice. Individual cases should be
weighed in the light of sound reasoning, and basic principles should
furnish a guide to equitable results. The basic distinctions between res
judicata in its "merger" and "bar" aspects and collateral estoppel are
important. Without them the way is cluttered. As the complexity of
litigation increases, the need for well-reasoned principles shows itself
more fully. The principles are clear, the application is difficult.
4 0
Id. at 111, 76 P.2d at 1120.
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